MWCC NO. 97-01029-G-2551

CYNTIHA LYNN ANDERSON                                                                                                           CLAIMANT

vs.

SOUTHERN OIL COMPANY                                                                                                             EMPLOYER
AND
FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY                                                                            CARRIER

REPRESENTING CLAIMANT:
William H. Jones, Esquire, Petal, MS

REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/CARRIER:
Donald V. Burch, Esquire, Jackson, MS
 

This matter was heard by the Commission on September 18, 2000 pursuant to the Claimant's Petition for Appeal and Review which questions an Opinion of the Administrative Judge dated April 13, 2000.
 

Cynthia Anderson sustained an admittedly compensable injury to her neck on December 10, 1996. Her weekly wage at the time of this injury was $328.05. The Administrative Judge found, and we agree, that Ms. Anderson reached maximum medical improvement from this injury on March 1, 1998 and is permanently disabled as a result. We differ with the Judge only as to the extent of permanent disability suffered by Ms. Anderson.
 
The Administrative Judge considered all of the relevant evidence and concluded that Ms. Anderson has a post injury earning capacity of approximately $260.00 per week. She awarded Ms. Anderson permanent partial disability benefits at the rate of two thirds of her lost earning capacity accordingly.
 
Based on our review of the evidence as a whole, we conclude that Ms. Anderson's post injury earning capacity is approximately $206.00 per week, or about $5.15 per hour. When compared to her pre-injury average weekly wage, this leaves Ms. Anderson with a loss of wage earning capacity of approximately $122.05 per week.¹
 
We therefore amend the Opinion of the Administrative Judge to provide that the Employer and Carrier pay permanent disability benefits to Ms. Anderson in the amount of $81.37 per week, beginning March 2, 1998 and continuing for a maximum period of 450 weeks. Miss. Code Ann. §71-3-17(c)(25) (Rev. 2000).
 
In all other respects, the Opinion of the Administrative Judge is affirmed, and we hereby adopt the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Judge as our own.
 

Finally, we can't help but note that counsel for Ms. Anderson was especially critical of the Administrative Judge in a brief he filed with the Commission. No less than nineteen (19) times does counsel question the Judge's motives and analytical abilities. To blatantly accuse this Judge, or any Judge of this Commission, as being "intellectually dishonest", "flat wrong", "obviously unfamiliar" with the applicable case law, "blinded" by her bias against the claimant, and of conducting a "poor analysis of the undisputed facts in this case", among other similar insults, is offensive to the Commission and shows a disturbing lack of respect that is not appreciated. Although we are able to arrive at our decision this day without any regard for the tenor of counsel's brief, it nonetheless bears pointing out as a postscript to our decision that every lawyer has a responsibility to "demonstrate respect for the legal system and those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials." Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, Miss. Rules of Professional Conduct. Sadly, this responsibility was forgotten in this case.

SO ORDERED this the 27th day of September, 2000.

MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Barrett Smith
Barney Schoby
Beverly Bolton

ATTEST:
Joann McDonald, Secretary
___________________________
 

MWCC NO. 97 01029-G-2551

CYNTHIA LYNN ANDERSON                                                                                                           CLAIMANT

vs.

SOUTHERN OIL CO.                                                                                                                          EMPLOYER
AND
FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.                                                                                         CARRIER

APPEARING FOR CLAIMANT:
William H. Jones, Attorney at Law, Petal, Mississippi

APPEARING FOR EMPLOYER/CARRIER:
Donald V. Burch, Attorney at Law, Jackson, Mississippi
 

The claimant sustained an admittedly compensable injury on December 10, 1996 while in the employ of Southern Oil Company (hereinafter "Southern"). At the hearing on the merits of this petition, held on November 17, 1999 in the Forrest County Chancery Building in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, the parties stipulated that the claimant's average weekly wage was $328.05, with a compensation rate of $218.70.
 

The issues remaining for decision by the Administrative judge are as follows:
 
1 . The extent and duration of the claimant's temporary disability;

2. The nature and extent of the claimant's permanent disability, if any, together with her loss of wage earning capacity;
 
3. Penalties and interest, if applicable;

4. The reasonableness and necessity of the medical treatment provided by Dr. G. Carr.
 

Cynthia Anderson is a 41 year old individual who completed the 11th grade in school and obtained a GED when she was in her thirties. The claimant has a nurse's aid certificate which she obtained from Pearl River Junior College; this course of study took six months to complete. She has had experience in several fields of occupational endeavor, including manufacturing, housekeeping, nurses aid work, and as a cashier and deli worker.² At the time of her injury at Southern, she served as an assistant manager of an Exxon station owned by Southern, although she had been a cashier and deli worker at the station forabout a year prior to becoming assistant manager.
 
The claimant testified that her duties at the time of her injury were to run the cash register, operate the deli, place orders for products needed at the station, keep the station stocked, schedule the work of other employees, keep the facilities clean and tidy, and fill in for other employees who miss their shifts. She testified that these tasks included quite a bit of lifting, including lifting bags of ice and syrup for fountain drinks. The claimant testified that when her injury occurred, she was carrying 5 bags of ice. One bag began to slip to her left side. As she tried to manage the ice bags and keep the slipping bag from failing, she felt a pop in her neck. She described the situation to Jonathan, her cashier at the time, and left the store at 1:30 a.m.

The claimant stated that she continued to work, although she had discomfort, and that approximately two weeks later, her supervisor, Shelia, came into the store and suggested that the claimant visit her family physician, Dr. Carr. The claimant did so. She indicated that Dr. Carr x-rayed her neck, took her off work, and enrolled her in a regime of physical therapy. Although she testified that she returned to work after physical therapy, Southern would not let her work unless she was released to return to work with no restrictions. At this juncture, Dr. Carr referred her to Dr. Bernardo, a neurosurgeon, who suggested she undergo more physical therapy, pain management, and who recommended surgery.
 
After the surgery recommendation, the adjuster, Brent Moore, sent the claimant for a second opinion to Dr. Brent, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Brent also recommended surgery. Although the claimant did not want surgery, she agreed to submit since both neurosurgeons had recommended the surgery.
 
The claimant testified that before her surgery, she experienced neck and shoulder pain. After the surgery, the claimant testified that her pain was worse both in her neck and shoulder. She required additional pain management and underwent a series of epidural steroids in her shoulder.
 
The claimant advised her adjuster, Brent Moore, that things were not going well, and she wanted to see another doctor. Brent Moore obtained an appointment for the claimant with Dr. Conn, but he refused to take workers' compensation patients. It appears from the testimony that her desire to have the services of another physician ended with Dr. Conn's unwillingness to take her as a patient, at least as far as the carrier was concerned. The claimant testified that it was at this time that she hired an attorney to represent her.

The claimant had returned to Dr. Carr for treatment, and he referred her to Dr. Melancon, an orthopaedic surgeon, in 1998. Her complaints at that time were pain in the neck, shoulders, arms, back and some hand pain and tremors. Dr. Melancon recommended more physical therapy and pain management. He suggested restrictions which include: no lifting over five pounds, no overhead work, no computer work, no sweeping, mopping, dusting, or stocking shelves. She testified that because her hand tremors are so severe, she can no longer drive a car.
 
At some point, the claimant testified that she obtained treatment by Dr. Winkelmann.³ He provided a brace for her left hand, which was fitted and, according to the claimant, has assisted her. At her second visit to the physician, she testified that he recommended a brace for her right hand. She testified that Dr. Winkelmann recommended rotator cuff surgery, but the claimant did not consider the surgery at the time and since the recommendation she has decided against the surgery.

The claimatit.testified that in 1998 she looked for employment at about six employers, including her old employer, speaking with the new manager, Brenda. After she declined the surgery recommended by Dr. Winkelmann, she met with Mr. Adams with the Mississippi Employment Security Commission. She has not obtained employment.

On cross-examination the claimant admitted that she had not seen Dr. Melancon since August of 1999, at which time he told her that he had "done all he could' for her. She also admitted that she had'not sought employment as a nurses aid since her injury and that at the time of the hearing, although she had not found employment, she had no pending applications.

Glenn Fortenberry testified on behalf of the employer and carrier as an expert in the field of vocational rehabilitation. Mr. Fortenberry testified that he prepared a labor market survey (exhibit E/C-9) after he had reviewed the medical records of Doctors Melancon, Winkelmann, Brent and Carr. He testified that limitations were essentially as the claimant testified. He further testified that in light of the claimant's medical condition and limitations, there are jobs available within those restrictions and limitations. Mr. Fortenberry carefully articulated the conditions surrounding the positions suggested in exhibit E/C-9, and also testified that this list was not an exhaustive one and that other jobs within the claimant's restrictions and limitations are available.

Mr. Fortenberry testified that he had considered the claimant's testimony and had heard her opinions of her condition but this did not cause him to modify his opinion that the claimant could work and could earn from $5.15 per hour to $6.50 per hour.
 
On cross-examination, Mr. Fortenberry testified that he did no testing of the claimant, but believed her when she testified that she had run a cash register. He indicated that scanners are less hand intensive than cash registers and should provide a task that would be easier for the claimant to perform than operating a traditional cash register.

Mr. Fortenberry indicated that he was not hired to place the claimant into a job, just to perform a labor market survey. He also testified that he did not speak with her former employer about re-hiring her.

Mr. Fortenberry submitted a labor survey which was admitted into evidence as exhibit E/C-9. This survey reflects that Mr. Fortenberry located 10 positions in the claimant's residential locale which paid from $5.15 to $6.50 per hour.

Keith P. Melancon, M.D. testified on behalf of the claimant by deposition taken April 27, 1999. It was stipulated between the parties that the physician is a licensed orthopaeclic surgeon practicing in the Hattiesburg medical community. The physician testified that he has no recollection as to how the claimant became his patient (whether through referral or through another course of action) but testified that he first saw her on November 17, 1998. On that date, the claimant revealed to the physician that she was experiencing pain in her neck and shoulder. She described an accident in 1996, her treatment by Dr. Brent, a neurosurgeon in Hattiesburg, and indicated that through his treatment some symptoms had resolved but she was still having significant left-sided neck and shoulder pain. X-rays revealed degeneration in her neck and an impingement of the acromion on the left rotator cuff. Dr. Melancon noted a permanent neurological problem in the C5 distribution from her previous surgery. A physicalexam i nation revealed evidence of C5 radiculopathy, a positive Neer test, and positive pain response on forward flexion and abduction. Dr. Melancon did not treat the claimant's neck at this time, since she had been treated by Dr. Brent, but did begin shoulder treatment, including injections and therapy. Dr. Melancon's diagnosis this date was rotator cuff tenclinitis or impingement syndrome. He determined that on that occasion she could only perform limited duty.

The physician saw the claimant again on December 12, 1998. She related that- the injection had not given her relief of significant duration. He ordered an MRI of her neck and shoulder. The MRI was performed on Christmas Eve and revealed mild osteophytic spurring causing minimal encroachment of the inferior aspect of the right C4-5 neural foramina, with similar osteophytic encroachment at C3-4, a discogenic bulge at C6-7 and a loss of disk space and canal narrowing at C5-6. The significance of these findings indicated to the physician that the claimant had sustained a significant amount of cervical spine degeneration with encroachment upon the right neural foramina at C5-6, which could account for the claimant's symptoms. A comparison with prior MRIs indicated that this problem was progressive. With respect to the shoulder, the MRI indicated a small amount of fluid in the subacromial space and inflarnation in the area. The MRI did not reveal a disruption in the rotator cuff, but, according to the physician, the radiologists "certainly were suspicious that that (sic) may indeed be something that's going on with Ms. Anderson."⁴ The physician testified that the history that the claimant had given of the accident (lifting bags of ice) is consistent with the physical findings relative to the claimant's shoulder.
 
Dr. Melancon saw the claimant on January 4, 1999 and advised her that the result of her MRI was negafive with respect to operable lesions in her cervical spine, although revealing about her shoulder condition. Dr. Melancon noted that the claimant was experiencing temperature changes and his concern was the possible development of reflex sympathetic dystrophy as a result of these temperature changes, as well as posturing and pain responses which were out of proportion, all of which were present at this time. Hebeganto treat the claimant for this condition with stellate ganglion blocks and rehabilitation. This treatment was established through pain management. Prior to the commencement of the pain management treatment, Dr. Melancon saw the claimant on January 16,1999 and determined that she had reached maximum medical improvement. He ordered a functional capacity evaluation (hereinafter "FCE"), which was obtained. Dr. Melancon reviewed the FCE, noting that the examiner indicated thatthe claimant offered less than maximum effort. He reviewed the results in conjunction with hisown treatmentof the claimantand developed thefollowing limitations and restrictions:

• no lifting in excess of 5 pounds

• no sweeping, mopping, vacuuming

• no computer work

• no overhead work.

It is the physician's opinion that the claimant's reflex sympathetic dystrophy has improved as a result of the injections that were performed in February and March, 1999, but that there is still evidence of a fiber mediated neuropathy or causalgia. He concluded his direct examination by noting that he found the claimant honest and truthful and that his findings and diagnosis were consistent with the history that she gave to him.

On cross-examination, Dr. Melancon admitted that hefirst saw the claimant almost two years post injury. He testified that he knew of no other medical condition which the claimant had that would impact on her present condition. Dr. Melancon testified that he was unaware that Dr. Brent had released the claimant at maximum medical improvement on February 1, 1998.
 
Dr. Melancon examined the FCE on cross-examination and conceded that one possible interpretation of the FCE findings would be that the claimant is trying to make her symptoms look worse than they really are. He indicated that he was certainly concerned about the claimant's forthrightness after reviewing the FCE, but that it is an observer-based examination and in dealing with her restrictions he included his experience with her as well as the results of the FCE.

The physician testified that he never advised the claimant not to work. He further testified that while in his office, the claimant never exhibited symptom magnification. He further testified that the claimant could not "fake" atrophy in her forearm or difference in temperature, both conditions which the claimant had.

The claimant commenced injectionswith Dr. McKellaron referral from Dr. Melancon. The injections occurred on February 9, 1999 and followed on the 16th and March 2, 1999.
 
Dr. Melancon was re-deposed on March 2, 2000. In addition to testifying to the veracity of his medical records which are reflected in exhibit 1 to this deposition, he testified that on August 1, 1999, it was his opinion that the claimant could return to full duty work. He admitted that he was very angry at the claimant, who had broken a clinic policy and-was actively procuring pain medication from more than one physician. However, he indicated that he would not change the previous restrictions that he gave the claimant.

Dr. Michael Winkelmann testified by medical records affidavit. Dr. Winkelmann testified that he saw the claimant on June 24, 1999 for a physiatric evaluation. He reviewed her medical history and treatment, medications, and performed a physical examination. He noted that the claimant's head and neck examination was benign except for upper trapezius tenderness, that she had slightly limited range of motion in the cervical spine, diminished supraspinatus shoulder girdle strength and slightly decreased grip strength with volitional variation of grip strength noted. He noted a degree of arthritic change at the base of the left thumb.
 
The physiatrist formed the impression that the claimant had clear myofascial complaints, trigger points in the upper trapezius, with suspected cervical facet pain components. He also noted a rotator cuff tear, left, osteoarthritic changes in the base of the left thumb, and left sided greater torchanter bursitis. He related the myofascial complaints, as well as the discomfort in her trapezius and cervical spine to her disk injury and fusion. He sought an EMG of'the upper extremities. This revealed clear evidence of persistent right medial nerve entrapment at the wrist with no slowing of u1nar nerve latencies across the elbow and no evidence of denervation or radiculopathy. The studies performed on the left were clear.
 
The medical records of ForrestCounty General Hospital, submitted by medical records affidavit, indicate, among other things, that the claimant was referred by Dr. Carr to Dr. Brent, who diagnosed a central disk protrusion at C5-6 which mildly compromised the spinal canal. He suggested anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at that level, as conservative treatment had achieved no appreciable improvement. Dr. Brent performed this procedure on October 27, 1998.
 
Dr. Garry D. Carr, the claimant's family physician, testified by medical records affidavit that he began treating the claimant in January of 1997 for her injury with medication and therapeutic methods and referred her to Dr. Kerry Bernardo, a neurosurgeon in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, in March of 1997. Dr. Bernardo saw the claimant on March 31, 1997 and reached the opinion, after performinga physical and neurological examination oftheclaimant and reviewing her history and an MRI of the cervical spine which was performed on January 17, 1997, that the claimant was suffering neck pain with left upper extremity radiculopathy, probably secondary to disk rupture at C5-6. He recommended epidural steroids with surgery to follow if the steroid injections did not significantly reduce her symptoms. A month later, Dr. Bernardo indicated to Dr. Carr that the injections performed by Dr. McKellar did not assist in reduction of symptoms, thatthe claimant's condition remains unchanged, and he suggested surgery, specifically an anterior cervical diskectomy with fusion at C5-6. He noted that the claimant declined the surgery, preferring to live with discomfort, and he had referred her for an FCE to assess her limitations and restrictions.

On May 15, 1997, Dr. Bernardo advised Dr. Carr that he had reviewed the results of the claimant's FCE with her, and that she had advised that she had obtained a second opinion as to whether she "needed" surgery. He indicated in this letter the claimant's apparent confusion and noted: "From an emotional standpoint she seems to be a real wreck. I don't think she can make a rationale (sic) decision regarding surgery given her current frame of mind."⁵
 
Dr. Carr's records then reflect an initial evaluation from Dr. Charles Brent of South Mississippi Neurosurgical Services in Hattiesburg. The evaluation reflects that Dr. Carr was the referring physician and that the claimant saw Dr. Brent on May 20, 1997. After taking a history, reviewing an MRI of the cervical spine performed on January 17, 1997, and performing an neurological examination, Dr. Brent formed the impression of cervical disk protrusion at C5-6 and recommended an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C5-6 after a cardiac evaluation.⁶
 
Dr. Kerry Bernardo, a neurosurgeon in Hattiesburg, testified by medical records affidavit. His testimony is contained in Dr. Carr's medical records affidavit and will not be reiterated here.

Dr. CharlesBrent, a neurosurgeon in Hattiesburg, testified byrnedical records affidavit. His pre-surgery testimony is contained in Dr. Carr's medical records affidavit and will not be reiterated here. After the claimant was seen by her cardiologist, Dr. Brent again saw the claimanton September 25, 1997 and recommended that she have cervical surgery, suggesting that she would be able to return to light duty within six weeks and unrestricted duty in three months. As an alternative, he would return the claimant to unrestricted duty on a trial basis with surgery as an option. Thereafter, the claimant requested pain medication on October 17, 1997. Subsequent to this request, surgery was performed as indicated in Dr. Carr's records. Eight days post surgery, Dr. Brent formed the impression that the claimant was "doing okay" although she reported burning in her neck and down her left arm with tingling in the left hand and burning when she sits, lays or stands too long.

A healthy exchange of telephone calls followed relative to pain medications, requests for refills, indications of effectiveness and the like, and a similar exchange follows all appointments with the claimant. On December 11, 1997 she reported to Dr. Brentthat "none of her symptoms ... are any better". On January 22, 1998 Dr. Brent evaluated her as three months post-surgery. At th is time she reported more pain now than pre-operatively. Dr. Brent obtained a new MRI of the cervical spine. The MRI revealed a satisfactory anterior decompression at C5-6 with no significant pathology. Dr. Brent noted that he could not explain the claimant's left arm pain by anything demonstrable. This appointment is followed by telephone calls relative to refills and the inadequacy of medications provided. On March 24, 1998, Dr. Brent advised that from a neurosurgical standpoint there is nothing which would keep the claimant from returning to work after March 1, 1998. The following day he made a referral to Dr. Conn at the claimant's request. The following day she was notified that Dr. Conn would not see her for various reasons.

Robert Bishop, an occupational therapist at Workwell, Wesley Medical Systems, testified by deposition. Mr. Bishop obtained a B. S. in occupational therapy from the Medical Center in Jackson and has been employed in the area of industrial rehabilitation for four years. Mr. Bishop testified that he performed an FCE on the claimant on January 25-26, 1999 at the request of Dr. Melancon and also wrote a report on that evaluation. Mr. Bishop indicated that the nature of the claimant's problem was left shoulder impingement. In Mr. Bishop's opinion, the claimant did not give a maximum consistent effort on the FCE. In his testimony, he noted various inconsistencies throughout the evaluation. He also testified that he observed her leaving the clinic in order to evaluate her pain behavior and compare it with the pain behavior exhibited in the clinic. He testified that the claimant was observed leaving the clinic and getting into the passenger side of the car without difficulty, without guarded movement, and that she demonstrated reaching capacity with the left upper extremity.
 

After consideringthe lay and experttestimony adduced in this cause, together with the documentary evidence and the relevant law, the undersigned finds as follows:

1 . It has been stipulated that the claimant sustained a work related injury on December 10, 1996 while in the employ of Southern and that the claimant's average weekly wage was $328.05, rendering a compensation rate of $218.70.
 
2. The claimant has received treatment from many physicians, and apparently all treatment has been authorized by the employer and carrier, save perhaps Dr. Carr's. While Dr. Brent places the claimant's maximum medical improvement March 1, 1998,
she continued to consistently complain of pain and sought orthopaedic intervention after her neurological surgery. Her orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Melancon, placed her at maximum medical improvement January 16, 1999. There are no medical records to reflect that any physician took the claimant off work after March 1, 1998 when Dr. Brent released her to return to work without restriction. In fact, it is Dr. Melancon's testimony that he never took the claimant off work. Although Dr. Brent released the claimant without limitation or restriction, Dr. Melancon's limitations and restrictions (principally resulting from her shoulder, not her cervical injury) are as follows:

• no lifting in excess of 5 pounds

• no sweeping, mopping, vacuuming

• no computer work

• no overhead work.

In determining whether a claimant has made reasonable efforts to find gainful employment, the facts of each case must' be examined individually, because "we cannot ... delineate any hard or fast rule as to how many or exactly what type efforts a claimant must make in every case in order to establish 'disability' within the purview of section 71-3-3 (i)."⁷

the economic and industrial aspect of the local community,

the jobs available in the community and surrounding area,

the claimant's general educational background, including work skills, and

the particular nature of the disability for which compensation is sought.⁸
 
4. In considering all of the evidence on the issue of job search, it is difficult to conclude that the claimant has met her burden. The weight of the evidence indicates that the claimant can find work available within her limitations and restrictions if she makes a reasonable search. An individual who has not been medically precluded from obtaining gainful employment since March 1, 1998 and who has sought employment at only six places, has done little to meet her statutory burden to prove her disability. On the other hand, Mr. Fortenberry's testimony compels the conclusion that the claimant could find employment within her limitations earning up to $260.00 per week and that there was ample work available in her residential community within her restrictions.

5. The record reflects no reason why Dr. Carr's treatment of the claimant should not be allowed, subject to the treatment being reasonable, necessary and billed at a level subject to the fee schedule.
 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the employer and carrier provide to the claimant as follows:

1. Temporary total disability benefits in the amountof $218.70 perweek from December 10, 1996 through March 1,1998, with credit for sums previously paid and for the weeks in which wages were earned by the claimant during this period;

2. Permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of $45.00 per week commencing March 1, 1998, and continuing for a period of 450 weeks;
 
3. Medical services and supplies pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated, section 71-3-15 (1972 and Supp. 1999) for so long as the nature of the injury and the process of the recovery may require, with fees and charges to be limited to that allowed pursuant to the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Medical Fee Schedule; and

4. Penalties on unpaid amounts of compensation as appropriate and authorized by Mississippi Code Annotated, section 71-3-37 (1972) and interest at the legal rate.

SO ORDERED this the 13th day of April, 2000.
 
LYDIA QUARLES
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

ATTEST:
Brenda H. Goolsby, Secretary
___________________________

1. We have assumed a standard 40 hour work week to compute Ms. Anderson's current earning capacity as it appears to us unlikely that more hours than this will be available to her.

2. This claimant also worked part-time at Pepper-jack's Pizza during her employment at Southern, essentially in the nature of a cashier and/or deli worker.

3. The claimant was sent to this physician as a General Rule 9 employer's medical evaluation.

4. Deposition of Dr. Melancon, April 27, 1999, p. 9, lines 15-17.

5. Letter from Dr. Bernardo to Dr. Carr, May 15, 1997.

6. Dr. Lowrimore, her cardiologist, cleared the claimant for general anesthetic at a low moderate cardiac risk.

7. Mary C. Ford v. Emhart, Inc. d/b/a True Temper Sports, Inc. and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, supra, p. 6, citing Thompson v. Weils-Lamont Corp., 362 So. 2d 638, 641 (Miss. 1978).

8. Robinson v. Packard Elec. Div., General Motors Corp., 523 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1988).