OFFICIAL ADVISORY OPINION NO. 97-108-E
August 15, 1997
 

This Advisory Opinion concerns the following issue as formulated from facts and/or circumstances furnished by a requestor. The Commission approved this opinion on August 15, 1997, basing its approval solely on the facts and circumstances stated herein.

State law restricts the Mississippi Ethics Commission to interpreting and issuing opinions on Sections 25-4-101 through 25-4-119, 1972 Mississippi Code Annotated and Article IV, Section 109, Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Therefore, this opinion does not address the Mississippi laws outside the Commission's jurisdiction nor the governmental entity's internal rules and regulations.

The pertinent conflict of interest laws to be considered here are:

Pertinent facts and circumstances in the form of the requestor's letter, absent identifying data, are attached hereto and considered a part of this opinion.

The Commission formally adopts Advisory Opinion No. 92-203-ER in response to this request and by attachment incorporates it into this opinion.

Based solely on the facts and circumstances presented by the requestor, the Commission's opinion is as follows.

In the attached advisory opinion, planning and development districts were determined to be "instruments of government" for purposes of the state conflict of interest laws.

Specifically, the attached advisory opinion states:

"PDD's are unique and are not clearly defined public entities. However, the Commission finds the PDD's are clearly instruments of government and are thus part of government under Section 25-4-103 (g)(v).

The Ethics laws concern private interests, not competing interests of two or more public entities or instruments. As the various governmental bodies are public bodies, and the PDD for purposes of this opinion is an instrument of government, there appears to be only competing public interests.

The government officials who serve on the PDD boards are not paid for their service. Their fiduciary responsibility as PDD board members concern only a public interest." [Emphasis added to bold text]

In this instance, the planning and development district's payment of fees to the alderman's law firm makes the alderman's interest one of a personal, pecuniary nature and not one of a public interest nature.

The State Supreme Court has said that the appropriation of funds is a necessary part of the contract authorization process. (1)

The city's appropriation to the planning and development district assists the planning and development district in sustaining its contracts and expenditures, including those contracts with and expenditures to the alderman's law firm.

Therefore, Constitutional Section 109 and Code Section 25-4-105 (2), both cited above, prohibit the alderman's law firm from contracting with the planning and development district when the alderman's city is providing funding to the planning and development district.

The requestor is advised that a recusal or an abstention will not prevent a violation of Constitutional Section 109 and Code Section 25-4-105 (2). Even without the board member's vote, the authorization by the member's board nonetheless results in a contract in which the board member has a prohibited interest.
 

1. See Frazier v. State , 504 So. 2d 675 (1987) and Cassibry v. State , 404 So. 2d 1360 (1981).